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ABSTRACT
In a hybrid cloud, individual cloud service providers (CSPs)
often have incentive to use each other’s resources to off-
load peak loads or place load closer to the end user. How-
ever, CSPs have to keep track of contributions and gains
in order to disincentivize long-term free-riding. We show
CloudShare, a distributed version of a load balancing algo-
rithm DirectCloud based on the Shapley value—a powerful
fairness concept from game theory. CloudShare coordinates
CSPs by a ZooKeeper-based coordination layer; each CSP
runs a broker that interacts with local resources (such as
Kubernetes-managed clusters). We quantitatively evaluate
our implementation by simulation. The results confirm that
CloudShare generates on the average more fair schedules
than the popular FairShare algorithm. We believe our results
show an viable alternative to monetary methods based on,
e.g., spot markets.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computer systems organization → Cloud comput-
ing; • Software and its engineering → Process manage-
ment; •Computingmethodologies→ Planning and sched-
uling;
KEYWORDS
scheduling, distributed, fairness, Shapley value, cooperative
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1 INTRODUCTION
In a hybrid cloud (supercloud) [3], CSPs might use each
other’s resources to offload peak loads or to move processing
closer to the end clients. Our principal contribution is an
algorithm and a prototype implementation of a distributed
broker that fairly balances the load between independent
CSPs.
Our notion of fairness stems from the Shapley value, a
fairness concept widely used in game theory and economics.
Informally, the Shapley value of an agent is equal to her
relative contribution to the common good. The goal of our
system is, essentially, to reward CSPs that provide resources
when these resources are truly needed, i.e., when others
indeed use them. The reward consists of priority treatment
of loads of such “accepting” CSPs when they, in turn, get
overflowed or prefer non-local processing.
However, our method might be also used for balancing the
loads and excess capacities directly between the clients of
CSPs. Usually, when the load is low, a client downscales its
rented resources. However, in some situations downscaling
is hard or sub-optimal: a client might have a long-term rent
agreement with a CSP; or it might prefer to keep renting
resources to get a rebate on the rent rate; or it might have
local, bare-metal resources. In such situations, with our meth-
ods clients could form grassroots load-balancing agreements,
trading their excess capacities (however, in order to simplify
the presentation, even in such scenarios we call the parties
trading the capacities as CSPs).
Our method is non-monetary, in contrast to monetary spot
markets used now to trade excess, short-term CSP capacity
by some providers [7]. A client could use spot instances
to dynamically migrate between CSPs [6]. However, spot
markets require the CSP to set and dynamically manipulate
the price, which is a non-trivial problem.
Our broker is decentralized. Individual CSPs run their lo-
cal brokers which communicate with each other through a
coordination layer. When a CSP wants to migrate a task, the
broker submits the task to the global queue. When another
CSP has free resources, its broker uses our CloudShare al-
gorithm to choose tasks from the global queue. The cloud
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API is not exposed outside the CSP: it is only accessed by
the broker (and perhaps other local submission systems: we
don’t require an exclusive access).
The local broker is implemented as a standalone Java ap-
plication with an embedded HTTP server. The prototype
supports executing jobs using local CPU or Kubernetes but
it could be extended to support other APIs (e.g., Slurm) by
implementation of another driver.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by discussing
related work in Section 2. We then formalize our resource
management model, show how to apply Shapley value to
cross-cloud load balancing and propose the load balancing
algorithm in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe our prototype
implementation. In Section 5 we show results of simulation
experiments.
2 RELATEDWORK
FairShare [8] is arguably the most popular approach to fair
scheduling. Fairness is based on predefined shares assigned
to each user (or a group). Task’s priority is proportional
to this share and inversely proportional to the actual (con-
sumed) share.
In our previous work [11, 12] we proposed an alternative
approach based on Shapley value [10]. We describe it in
detail in Section 3.2. In this paper, we adopt DirectContr, a
heuristic proposed in [12] to a decentralized environment
and to cloud computing scenario.
The notion of contribution in DirectContr is similar to
reputation used in OurGrid [1]. However, our method allows
sites to choose tasks (rather than being requested to do some).
Moreover, our method is based on and tested against a notion
of fairness widely accepted in other fields.
We deliberately focus on a single issue: fairness in cross-
site scheduling. To construct a viable prototype, we do not
address many orthogonal problems. For instance, we use
standard container repositories to instantiate a task, while a
complete system should use cross-cloud data storage such
as [9]; or even consider VM migration between perhaps
binary-incompatible CSPs. Similarly, we do not consider the
problem of different APIs—we assume that each resource
is represented by a driver exposing common functionality
(which in a complete system requires a cloud orchestration
tool [2]).
3 THEORY: MODEL AND ALGORITHMS
This section introduces the theoretical motivation, the algo-
rithm and the architecture of CloudShare.
3.1 Vocabulary and Assumptions
We call a federation a system composed of multiple CSPs
that balance the load. We call an individual CSP also an
Figure 1: ClusterShare overview
organization (a term common in the theoretical works). Each
CSP (organization) has a certain number of machines that
correspond to physical machines or VMs rented on the long-
term. We assume a machine has a certain number of CPU
cores (to simplify our theoretical model, we assume that the
CPU is the sole resource — however it is easy to generalize
our approach to multiple resources). Each CSP processes
jobs that are initially submitted locally to this CSP (e.g. by
the end clients). We consider an on-line problem with non-
zero release dates: a job is not known until the moment it is
submitted to a CSP. Each job declares the number of CPU
cores it requires exclusively (such declaration is equivalent
to, e.g., VM capacity or resource requirements in Kubernetes).
Each job will be executed on a single machine, but a single
machine can execute multiple jobs at the same time (with no
overbooking of the available cores). Jobs have finite duration,
but the scheduler does not know the job’s duration until the
job completes (finishes) (a non-clairvoyant problem). Each
organization uses a utility function as a performance measure
(e.g., the average flow time).
Cooperation of CSPs requires some level of trust. We as-
sume that a CSP does not try to tamper jobs, i.e., all results are
genuine outcomes of job execution. In general, verification
of a result may require performing the same computation.
Therefore it does not make sense to ask untrusted party to
run a job. Similarly all metadata (e.g. job start and comple-
tion time) must be true. An organization might simulate long
execution of a job by delaying the result announcement and
supplying false time stamps. This could artificially increase
priority of the organization and it would be hard to detect,
as it is difficult to predict duration of a job based solely on
its definition. We also assume that CSPs do not alter broker
implementations or the data (these problems are orthogonal
to the main issue).
3.2 Fairness based on Shapley Value
Following our earlier theoretical works [11, 12], we base our
notion of fairness on the Shapley value. The main difference
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from FairShare (see Section 2) is that share entitlements are
not predefined. Instead, they depend on CSP’s impact on the
federation. The aim is to promote organizations which pro-
vide resources when they are needed by assigning a higher
priority to their jobs. Calculation of target shares is based
on game theoretical concept of Shapley value
3.2.1 Shapley value. A concept from game theory, the
Shapley value [10] can be interpreted as a value that a mem-
ber brings to the community (a coalition). The formulation
assumes there is a characteristic function f which assigns
a value to every subset of possible coalition members, N .
Shapley value ϕo of organization o is:
ϕo(f ) =
∑
S ⊆N \{o }
|S |! (n − |S | − 1)!
n! (f (S ∪ {o}) − f (S)). (1)
Thus, the Shapley value of o is essentially its average mar-
ginal contribution to coalition value: the difference between
the value of the characteristic function for a subset including
the member and the same subset excluding the member. It
has desirable properties of efficiency, symmetry, linearity and
assigns 0 to the members who do not contribute anything to
the coalition.
As an illustration, for simplicity assume that the char-
acteristic function f is the difference between the number
of completed and submitted jobs. Two events change the
Shapley value ϕo : submitting a job or completing it. An orga-
nization which does not submit or complete any tasks will
have zero Shapley value. An organization that has completed
more tasks than it (locally) submitted will have a positive
Shapley value; and an organization only submitting tasks,
but not accepting any tasks will have a negative Shapley
value.
A scheduling algorithm uses Shapley value as a bench-
mark. Ideally, the value of the organization’s utility function
should be equal to its Shapley value, ϕo . However, as the
problem is discrete, it might be not possible to achieve such
a schedule (e.g.: an organization does not submit any jobs,
but accepts jobs from others). Thus, the goal is to construct a
schedule with utilities as close to Shapley values as possible
(see [11] for a more formal discussion).
3.2.2 Utility/characteristic functions. The Shapley value
relies on the utility function f quantifying the quality of the
schedule from the coalition’s perspective.
In our previous work [11], we proposed a non-manipulable
utility function that is the sum of utilities for individual jobs j
computed as:
ψ (j) = (e(j) − s(j)) · cpu(j) ·
(
T − s(j) + e(j) − 12
)
, (2)
where s(j) denotes the time the job j started; e(j)—job j ended,
T—the current time and cpu(j)—the number processor cores
j used (an extension we added here, as [11] considered only
sequential jobs). The utility is proportional to the duration
and depends on the start time.
The term
(
T − s(j)+e(j)−12
)
expresses the time since the
job is run. The motivation was to capture utility of having
the same amount of work done faster. However, in a long
running system, it might be impossible to “make up” for the
sub-optimal decisions taken at the beginning of the schedule.
Therefore, we also test a slightly altered utility, where the
release time r (j) neutralizes this effect:
ψ ′(j) = (e(j)−s(j)) ∗cpu(j) ∗
(
T +r (j)− e(j) + s(j) − 12
)
. (3)
Finally, we also consider a function that sums the surface
of executed jobs (with no reward for executing a job earlier):
ψ ′′(j) = (e(j) − s(j)) ∗ cpu(j). (4)
Whileψ ′′ does not adequately express utility, it is reasonable
in expressing contribution—the effort of a site that accepts
non-local jobs.
3.2.3 DirectContr: Scheduling based on Shapley Value.
Calculating the Shapley for an organization is NP-hard and
hard to approximate [11]. We proposed a fast heuristic called
DirectContr [12]. Instead of computing the Shapley value
from the definition (Eq. 1), the algorithm estimates the con-
tribution of an organization o by summing utilities from jobs
executed on o’s resources. The algorithm works as follows.
An organization o submits its jobs to its queue Qo . Each
time a processor becomes available, the algorithm selects the
organization o∗ that has the highest difference between its
contribution and its utility—we will call this difference the
priority (if there are multiple free processors, the algorithm
selects one randomly). Then, it executes the first job from
this organization’s queue, Qo∗ .
By simulation, in [12] we showed that the “unfairness” of
the resulting schedule is relatively close to the exact, expo-
nential algorithm, and significantly lower than the FairShare.
This result can be intuitively explained on an example (see
Figures 2 and 3). Consider two organizations A and B, each
with a single machine. A submits a job at time 0, 2, 4, 6 and 8.
B submits two jobs at time 4. Consider the situation at time 4.
In DirectShare (Figure 2), priorities of A and B are equal: jobs
were executed on local resources, thus both organization
have 0 contribution. In contrast, in FairShare, B has higher
priority: both organizations have the same predefined share
but all completed jobs belong to organization A. FairShare
scheduler would decide to start both jobs submitted by B
immediately (Figure 3). In the aftermath jobs A3, A4 and A5
are delayed 5 time units compared to the DirectContr sched-
ule. Moreover, we could multiply the number of processors
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Figure 2: DirectContr schedule
Figure 3: FairShare schedule
or extend the job duration to arbitrarily large total delay of
organization A’s jobs.
3.3 Distributed Scheduling in ClusterShare
ClusterShare adapts DirectContr to the federated cloud in-
frastructure. An organization (a CSP) is represented in the
system by a broker, responsible for tracking local resources,
submitting local tasks to the federation, selecting and exe-
cuting foreign tasks on the local resources.
ClusterShare keeps the state of the system in a coordination
layer, a distributed data structure shared across brokers. The
coordination layer keeps track of non-local jobs’ life-cycle
and execution parameters.
In contrast to DirectContr, scheduling decisions in Cluster-
Share are distributed: each broker reacts to events indepen-
dently. This approach has several advantages: (i) the decision
to expose local resources might be taken dynamically; (ii) lo-
cal resource schedulers may pursue custom goals like power
efficiency; (iii) resources can be exposed to the federation
through existing interfaces.
ClusterShare is event-based. Every broker handles events
sequentially in order of their appearance. The following
events are handled:
(1) a new task is submitted by a local user;
(2) a new task is submitted to the federation;
(3) a local resource is ready to execute a task;
(4) a local resource completed a task;
(5) a site left the federation.
When a task is submitted by a local user (event 1), the
broker first checks whether the site has enough resources
to run the job locally. If there is enough capacity and no
other tasks are waiting then the task is delegated to a free
machine directly. Otherwise the broker publishes the task in
the coordination layer.
When a new task is published in the coordination layer
(event 2), the broker propagates the event to every config-
ured resource handler. Some handlers will wait until there
is enough capacity to run the job, others will submit a pilot
job in order to acquire them.
Once a resource handler is ready to execute a job (event
3), it notifies the broker, which picks a federation job (we
show the algorithm below). In our implementation, a local
machine is exposed to the federation (and thus event 3 is
produced) when two conditions are met: (i) the overall reser-
vation ratio is below a certain threshold (e.g.: 30% of the total
CPU power is not reserved by currently executing tasks); (ii)
there is at least one machine capable of executing a task. The
threshold is used to neutralize uncertainty resulting from
monitoring delay. This strategy is especially useful for re-
sources which discard jobs that they cannot accept due to
insufficient capacity rather than appending them to a queue
(like Kubernetes).
Continuing with handling event 3, the broker first loads
all waiting tasks from the coordination layer and filters those
that match the offer. Then, a task is chosen according to a
strategy based on DirectContr, i.e., first, an organization is
picked according to the priority (the difference between the
contribution and organization’s utility); then, the longest
waiting task of this organization is chosen. Once the job is
selected the broker registers itself as the provider via coordi-
nation layer and initiates job execution.
When a task ends (event 4), a resource handler notifies the
broker. The broker updates the job status in the coordination
layer and saves scheduling-relevant parameters such as the
start time, the end time and the job definition.
When organization looses connection to the federation
(event 5), jobs that were computed by the disconnected or-
ganization are treated as if they were just submitted to the
federation to ensure that they will be rescheduled. Jobs sub-
mitted by the lost site are removed, apart from those which
are already being executed.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we describe how we map the architecture
and the algorithm described above to a hybrid cloud infras-
tructure. Our implementation is composed of three logical
layers: (i) the coordination layer responsible for storing the
data shared across CSPs; (ii) the application layer implement-
ing the ClusterShare algorithm; and (iii) the external layer
abstracting the resources our algorithm manages.
The coordination layer keeps track of non-local jobs’ life-
cycle and execution parameters. To increase resilience, we
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use Apache ZooKeeper [5], a well-known, distributed open-
source coordination service. ZooKeeper servers can run on
the same machines that organizations use to expose their
brokers or they can be deployed on separate machines. Bro-
kers use ZooKeeper clients to communicate with ZooKeeper
servers. It is easy to add new CSPs to the hybrid cloud: all a
newmember has to do is to connect to the already established
ZooKeeper ensemble.
The application layer is composed of symmetrical brokers—
each broker represents a CSP. A broker manages only the
resources of its CSP. Brokers use the coordination layer to
communicate across CSP boundaries. A broker also exposes
an HTTP interface for accepting jobs from its local users.
Each of CSP resources (e.g., a Kubernetes-managed clus-
ter, or a Slurm-managed cluster) is represented through a
resource handler with a common interface.
To test various scheduling algorithms, we abstract any
algorithm through an interface with a single method. The
method, given a collection of jobs, selects the one with the
highest priority (priority calculation depends on the algo-
rithm).
As ZooKeeper, our coordination layer, is not well-suited
for storing large data, a scheduling algorithm periodically
replaces the historic scheduling data with a summary that
allows to calculate priorities in the future without resorting
to the original release/completion times.
The external layer includes resources managed by Cluster-
Share brokers and peripheral services (such as broker’s client
interface or container libraries). To instantiate our system,
we focus on sharing Kubernetes-managed clusters. The bro-
ker uses Kubernetes to start a task, monitor its progress and
also monitor the state of the resources (e.g.: whether there
are free resources to start a foreign task). We use one-to-one
mapping between ClusterShare tasks and Kubernetes job
definition: container image name, command arguments, and
resource requirements are copied directly. ClusterShare does
not directly manage the containers, nor the eventual results.
We envision a setup where CSPs share access to container
image repositories and perhaps file repositories. An image
should describe both the actual task and result delivery.
5 SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
To quantitatively evaluate ClusterShare, we performed simu-
lation experiments in which we compared the performance
of a number of algorithms.
5.1 Method
As our goal was to evaluate the system in steady-state and
on workloads lasting days rather than minutes, instead of
emulation, we decided to implement a simple, event-based
simulator. Our simulator replaces the original external and
coordination layers of ClusterShare with fast, in-memory
implementations; the broker module is the same as in the
ClusterShare system. The simulator also allows us to submit
tasks at each site according to a workload (log) and then to
compute the performance of the schedule.
To compare how “good” a particular schedule is, for each
CSP we compute the total wait time of tasks (the time be-
tween a task is submitted and it is started). It is an intuitive
measure: improved wait time can be the primary reason to
federate in a hybrid cloud. However, the wait time might be
sensitive to even minor changes in the schedule (for instance,
a long task scheduled a unit time earlier might delay a large
number of other tasks). Moreover, rather than using the wait
time directly, we compute the unfairness, or the distance be-
tween the resulting vector of waiting times and the perfectly
fair vector (the Shapley value). This requires that the sum of
utilities is constant (i.e.: all possible schedules have the same
total wait time; only the distribution of the wait time across
CSPs changes), because it is interpreted as a characteristic
value of a coalition (explained below) which should be fixed
for a given log sample. For these reasons, we convert tasks
in the logs by, first, replacing a q-processor task with q tasks
requiring a single processor; and then replacing a task lasting
p hours with ⌈p⌉ tasks each lasting an hour. We stress that
this processing is done to emphasize the differences between
scheduling algorithm policies: this method only reduces the
noise in the observed results.
Given a log, for each tested algorithm we run 2N − 1
simulations (where N = 5 is the number of CSPs). Thus,
there are 5 simulations in which each CSP uses only its local
resources; 10 simulations for pairs of collaborating CSPs, . . . ,
and one simulation for the grand coalition of 5 CSPs. Each
simulation yields a vector (of length N) of total wait time. The
sum of this vector is the characteristic value of the coalition,
since we assumed that total wait time is our characteristic
function. We use all 2N − 1 vectors to compute the Shapley
value for each coalition (Eq. 1). Thus we can evaluate the
unfairness of a schedule by comparing total wait times of
organizations with their Shapley values.
We aggregate results across logs as follows. We assign a
score to each algorithm based on how it performs in com-
parison to other algorithms. The score is incremented every
time an algorithm is more fair than another algorithm. For
instance, if we test 3 algorithms A, B and C, and the sim-
ulator generated three schedules σA, σB and σC with their
respective unfairness of 60, 80 and 60, then we assign 1 point
for A and 1 point for C (an alternative, the average deviation
from the fair wait time distribution, might vary significantly
across different logs).
We use HPC2N, DAS2 fs0, LPC EGEE and MetaCentrum
logs from [4]. From each log, we take 20 randomly-chosen
periods of 24 hours; we take all jobs submitted during these
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Algorithm Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
ORIG_DIRECT 3051 3095 2110
REL_DIRECT 3840 3793 2420
SIMPL_DIRECT 4061 3955 2415
FAIRSHARE 3108 3436 1621
ROUND_ROBIN 1302 917 871
Table 1: Total scores: how many times a given algo-
rithm is more fair than another algorithm
24 hours, keeping their relative release dates. Each job is
local to some CSP; as in a log each job has an owner user
ID. We map these user IDs onto CSPs (and assign number of
processors to each CSP) as follows:
Scenario 1 CSPs have equal number of processors; users
are randomly assigned to CSPs.
Scenario 2 distribution of processors across CSP follows
the Zipf law; users are randomly assigned to CSPs.
Scenario 3 CSPs have equal number of processors; users are
divided into two categories: ClusterShare users who submit
to the broker (as in previous two scenarios); and users local
to each CSPs generating background load.
5.2 Algorithms
We compare a few variants of ClusterShare with more classic
approaches:
Original direct contribution (ORIG_DIRECT) implements
a distributed version of DirectContr withψ utility function
(Section 3.2.2).
Relative direct contribution (REL_DIRECT) usesψ ′ utility
(adjusting utility by release time).
Simplified direct contribution (SIMPL_DIRECT) uses ψ ′′
utility; this algorithm tests whether direct contribution algo-
rithm could be simplified without sacrificing fairness.
FairShare uses shares proportional to the number of pro-
cessors a CSP contributes. The algorithm measures the total
processing time assigned to each organization (just asψ ′′).
The CSP with the the smallest ratio of utility to share has
the highest priority.
Round robin implementation is based on LRU cache in-
validation. The algorithm selects the CSP which has never
been chosen yet or (if all were selected at least once) the one
whose most recently started job was started least recently.
5.3 Results
We summarize the scores in Table 1. First, while ROUND_ROBIN
scored significantly less points then other algorithms, its re-
sult is not 0: on some logs and some scenarios, ROUND_ROBIN
performs better than seemingly more fair algorithms.
Second, DirectContr produces more fair schedules than
FairShare. The scores of SIMPL_DIRECT and REL_DIRECT
were better than scores of FAIRSHARE in every scenario and
every analyzed configuration. SIMPL_DIRECT version of Di-
rectContr unexpectedly achieved the highest total score in
Scenarios 1 and 2. The advantage over REL_DIRECT is not
very significant though. ORIG_DIRECT performed well in
some configurations but its total score is below the score of
FairShare in the first two scenarios.
Third, when the amount of contributed resources changes
dynamically (Scenario 3), the number of processors does not
correspond to the contribution. As, DirectContr does not
assume fixed shares (unlike FairShare), thus the advantage
of DirectContr is more visible.
6 CONCLUSION
ClusterShare is a prototype system for fair resource sharing
in a hybrid cloud. Our main objective was to adapt Direct-
Contr algorithm to a distributed system and cloud computing
scenario. Clustershare was designed to be flexible and re-
silient. There is no need for common federation servers —
deployment on private servers of organizations is possible.
The federation can grow or shrink spontaneously without
disrupting the system. Each site is responsible for its own
resources only but it picks jobs from the common queue
based on the global priority of each site. Container engine
guarantees job portability between sites and resources.
We verified performance of our method by simulation.
Our results show that methods based on the Shapley value
lead to more fair outcome distribution than FairShare.
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